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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT - MALPRACTICE - ACCRUAL OF ACTION STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - Plaintiff, in March, 1934, while in the employ
of a manufacturing concern, suffered severe injuries. In September, 1935, he
employed the defendant, an attorney, to present and prosecute a claim for compensatiqn. The claim was filed in March, 1937; it was dismissed by the Industrial Commission on the ground that it was barred by the two-year statute
of limitations governing such claims. Apparently the attorney, continuing his
efforts on behalf of his client, persuaded the employer to make a voluntary
settlement, for the plaintiff alleges that, in May of 1940, he endorsed the employer's check over to the attorney, accepted the attorney's· check for a lesser
amount/ and terminated the attorney-client relationship. Early in May, 1941,
plaintiff brought this action, claiming negligent delay, on the part of the defendant, amounting to malpractice. The court sustained the defendant's demurrer, and held that this malpractice action was barred by an applicable
one-year statute of limitation; this period had begun to run, it wa's said, as soon
as the plaintiff's claim against the employer became stale.2 GallowaJ' 'lJ. Hood,
69 Ohio App. 278, 43 N. E. (2d) 631 (1941).8
The case presents a novel fact situation. Seldom is a litigant forced to bow
twice to the statute of limitations. And, in this particular case, if the dates
suggested are correct, it would appear that, at the time the Industrial Commission was denying plaintiff's claim against the employer because of the twoyear statutory period, the one-year statute had already operated to bar his action
against the allegedly negligent lawyer whose delay resulted in that denial.

1 A second cause of action, based upon a claim for money had and received, and
_praying for the recovery of the difference between the amount· of the employer's
check and that of the attorney, was remanded.
2 "In the absence of fraud or concealment on the part of the attorney (which is
not here alleged) the statute of limitations in cases charging malfeasance or nonfeasance
on the part of an attorney at law begins to run ( that is, the cause of action 'accrues')
when the acts constituting the malpractice occur-in this case when the defendants
permitted the time to expire within which the plaintiff's claim could be presented and
prosecuted to escape the bar of the statute of limitations on the claim." Principal case,
69 Ohio App. at 281.
8 The fact that the case may "go up on appeal" prompts more than ordinary
restraint in comment.
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Moreover, the case presents an interesting legal question. There is a distinct
split of authority as to the date when the cause of action accrues in a case
involving alleged malpractice on the part of a physician or surgeon. Some courts
hold that the statute begins to run against the injured patient "when the wrong
is done." 4 Other courts have accepted a doctrine which is more favorable to
the patient; they use the "termination of treatment," or "termination of relationship" date. 5 After a little "backing and filling," the Ohio Supreme Court,
in 1919, reaffirmed its original position and adopted the rule which permits
a malpractice action to be brought, in the physician-patient cases, within the
statutory period after the professional relationship has terminated.6 It was
argued, in the principal case, that the same rule should apply in a case charging
an attorney with negligent delay. It might be assumed that those courts which
have given the patient extra time for the bringing of his suit against a negligent
surgeon have done so, primarily, because of the rather helpless situation in
which an injured patient finds himself. One would suppose that any consideration for the defendant physician would be, at best, a matter of secondary importance, and merely incidental.1 But the Ohio court, in the instant case,
stressed the fact that, in the leading Ohio physician-patient case, it had been
said that it was only fair that the surgeon be given an opportunity to "correct
the eVJ1s" which made the treatment necessary, and reasonable time and opportunity to "correct the ordinary and usual mistakes incident to even skilled surgery." Then, declaring that this "after-care" argument was not appropriate in
the attorney-client case, 8 the court decided that the statute begins to run, in the
legal relationship cases, at the time of the wrong. If, as the Ohio Supreme Court
has said, we should not "impose upon the patient a duty that he can only know
through expert knowledge which he does not possess, but as to which he is compelled to accept the judgment of his physician or surgeon," 9 it would seem that
the same regard for the unfavorable position of the layman would suggest the
4
See, for example, Graham v. Updegraph, 144 Kans. 45, 58 P. (2d) 475
(1936), and cases cited therein. The Kansas case was commented upon in 35 MICH.
L. REV. 838 (1937).
5
See, for example, Schmit v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354, 236 N. W. 622 (1931),
and cases mentioned in 35 MICH. L. REv. 838 at 841, note IO (1937).
e Professor Dawson's article, "Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation," 31 M1cH. L. REv. 875 (1933), contains a discussion of the three leading Ohio
cases: Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N. E. 865 (1902); McArthur v.
Bowers, 72 Ohio St. 656, 76 N. E. II28 (1906); and Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio
St. 361, 124 N. E. 238 (1919).
1 The language in the opinion in the case of Bowers v._ Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361
at 368, 124 N. E. 238 (1919), seems to make this quite clear. After pointing out
the unfairness, to the patient, of the "time of the wrong" rule, emphasizing the patient's inability to know the facts, and the necessity of reliance, on his part, on the
defendant, the court adds: "Moreover, it is clearly just to the surgeon that he be not
harassed by any premature litigation."
8 The facts in the instant case suggest some "after-care." Though he interposed
the defense of the statute of limitations against the claim, the employer seems to have
been persuaded to make a voluntary settlement of some $6,000.
9
Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361 at 367, 124 N. E. 238 (1919).
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conclusion that he should be given an opportunity to employ another lawyer
who can inform him of the necessity of prompt action against the offending
attorney.10

P.A.L.

10 As suggested in note 3, supra, it is fitting that this comment be most restrained.
It may be "within bounds,". however, to speculate upon the effect of such a decision
as this, in an era when leading bar associations are emphasizing the importance of
good "public relations." Moreover, in the light of the result of this case, what must
a layman do to be even partially certain that his legal rights are .being given proper
protection by the members of our profession? Must he employ a second attorney to
check up on the first? And, finally, in the light of the suggestion as to the harassment
involved in premature litigation in the surgeon's case (see supra, note 7), one may
speculate on the half-hearted presentation of Galloway's claim, in the principal case, if,
cognizant of his rights, he had brought this malpractice action in time.

